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Abstract 
The constitution is considered as the fundamental act of the state and generally, the mechanisms that allow its 
revision are well thought out by the legislatorthese interventionsto be effective and at the right moment.The 
constitutional amendments of 2008 to 11 articles of the highest act of the state indicated that political interests 
were placed opposite the lack of transparency and lack of public information, being excluded from decision-
making. The question arises now is: Does the constitutional changes brought in April 2008, the expected effect 
or were motivated by the interests of the political class to avoid difficulties in the process of electing the 
President? The purpose of this paper is the analysis of the effect of these changes and the proposal for a 
constitutional reform in several basic institutions of the state and society. Currently, although we can conclude 
that it is still early, we can objectively assess the impact and consequences that led to constitutional system and 
social changes. In this context, it is necessary to become a proper analysis and a thorough study before 
discussing about another constitutional reform. The recent past should serve as a reference point to understand 
that we should show prudence before you reproduce the amendments to the Constitution. 
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1. Introduction  
If we do a retrospective in time, to understand the whole process in which discussions have passed and then the 
decisions on constitutional changes, the first element that will draw attention to us is very short time and the 
tendency for this process to “monopolized” by actors and factors, which had interests and direct impacts on the 
performance of these changes.The commission on Legal Affairs, Public Administration and Human Rights, in 
meetings of the dates 7, 9, 14, 16 and 18 April 2008, acting as the responsible commission, took into 
examination the draft law “On Amendments to the Law no. 8417, dated 21.10.1998 (Constitution of the 
Republic of Albania)”, as amended, at the initiative of more than 1/5 of Assembly. In the Law Commission took 
place in principle the discussion of the draft amendments to the Constitution.Rapporteurs appointed by the 
commission made, their comments about the proposed amendments and based on initial consultations they 
presented some new proposals. 
On 21 April 2008, with an unreasonable hurry, just within a few hours and indoors, which preclude any 
kind of transparency, the major political forces decided to intervene in the 11 articles of the constitution, 
specifically in Articles 64, 65, 67, 68, 87, 88, 104, 105, 149, 153 and 154.The small parties were avoided. To 
general public lacked the information. There were several reactions, generally in visual and written media, but 
they were not taken into consideration. The draft amendments were adopted. The Parliament did not avail the 
right they sent for assessment through a referendum. Due to the non-completion of the 1/5 quorum of deputies 
was not reached that the draft constitutional amendments subject to referendum. This is a right, which the 
Constitution stipulates1. In this regard, the initiative did not succeed nor the movement “For the protection of the 
constitution”, which was to organize a referendum in order to be prevented hasty decisions.The Constitutional 
Court stated that the organization of a referendum on constitutional issues should be in accordance with Article 
177 of the Constitution.  
Before analyzing the effect of the constitutional changes widely of 2008, I think it is important to be 
concentrated on the proposals and the respective arguments of the representatives of the major political forces to 
reinforce the necessity of intervention in the constitution, in order to guarantee the stability of the government.To 
be taken into consideration is the fact that the originators of these constitutional amendments have not paid 
attention to other articles, which were affected by these changes. For example, a typical case is the term of the 
General Prosecutor, who is 5 years old. The Constitution has been amended, but prosecutors in duty were 
appointed before the constitutional changes, when the mandate, there was no term. In addition, one of the 
principles of the rule of law is that laws generally do not have retrospective effect. However, constitutional 
changes had no transitional provision and the time when it expires is legally ambiguous. 
 
2. The amended Electoral Code - a backward step for representative democracy 
If we analyzed the amendments proposed by the Parliamentary Group, of the Socialist Party, signed by more 
than 1/5 of deputies, their focus was on changing the electoral system model defined in the Constitution.Thus 
                                                          
1Article 177 of the Constitution of the Republic of Albania 
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from mixed majority-proportional system that provided the previous constitution, is proposed proportional 
system with multi-name-election areas.The rapporteur of the largest opposition party at that time, said that the 
proposed bill, with the presented system would bring simplification of the voting process in the calculation of 
competitive seats for each subject, and of the issuance as soon as the election results, guaranteeing of 
government stability, more just representation of women in legislative, etc... This model of electoral system 
helps in maintaining, updating and creation of political elites, it realizes a distribution, most diverse political, 
between the political forces in the whole territory of the country and provides a more just representation between 
the vote, and division of seats in the Assembly.1 
It was also argued that the new proposed electoral system was in accordance with all fundamental 
constitutional principles of guaranteeing the free vote, the wide access to voting and larger political 
competition.The system will result in compliance with all recognized principles of the OSCE ODIHR or 
Copenhagen card for electoral systems that guarantee free and honestelections.The adoption of these changes 
would make possible the continuation of work on electoral reform related to the reflection of these changes and 
addressing of a number of other issues in the Election Code.The conclusion in a faster time of constitutional and 
legal framework will lay the foundations for the timely and quality preparation of the upcoming electoral process 
to enable a fair and free electionprocess, in respect of the international standards largely recognized in this field 
and our constitutional norms. 
In this context, it is worth to note that, despite these changes are justified by the compliance, within the 
context of the principles affirmed in the Charter of Copenhagen and other institutions, which guarantee genuine 
democratic standards. In reality, these changes did not bring any innovation.They failed to produce a more 
democratic electoral model and I do not think they increased their representative democracy.Suffice it to mention 
the fact that since the adoption of the constitutional amendments and until now, has not been developed any 
referendum even though the Albanian society has undergone several reforms of great importance not only of a 
constitutional nature, but also social. 
The last case is administrative-territorial reform, which would be subject to referendum easily, if the 
Electoral Code would be reformed in order to effectively enhance the democracy of voters to express their will 
directly.The Electoral Code of year 2000, predicts referendums in a particular part, and treats the meaning of 
referendum 2 , limitations on the exercise of the right of referendum, 3 the procedures for the conduct of 
referendums,4and specific types of referendums.5Meanwhile it appears that in electoral codes of the period from 
2000 to December of 2008, has a special chapter “for referendums”.This chapter, although it is applicable, is not 
included in the code of 2008.In 2004, the OSCE / ODIHR and the Venice Commission have recommended to be 
reviewed almost all the provisions of this chapter. 
In the framework of electoral reform following an agreement reached on 1 July 2004 between the ruling 
Socialist Party and the opposition Democratic Party, the presence, established and chaired a Technical Expert 
Group in order to design changes to the Electoral Code, in accordance with , the joint recommendations, made 
by the OSCE / ODIHR and Council of Europe.6The group included as independent experts and the experts 
appointed by political parties, prepared legislative drafts, which should be presented to a special parliamentary 
commission on electoral reform for discussion and decision-making. The lack of an agreement on the 
composition of the Central Election Commission blocked the work of the Technical Expert Group and the 
special commission up to reach an agreement SP-DP on October 14. 
The agreement, facilitated by the presence, provided that a member of the CEC to lose his place and 
substitute member appointed by the largest party in opposition, the DP. This agreement resolved one of the most 
controversial issues in the past elections in Albania and paved the way for the adoption of other steps in the 
electoral reform, as legal package in relation to voter lists and the beginning of the verification and registration 
of citizens. 7By not taking into consideration the recommendations, in December 2008 electoral code was 
                                                          
1Report: On the draft law “On some Amendments to the Law no. 8417, dated 21.10.1998”, “The Constitution of the Republic 
of Albania”, as amended. 
2Article 114 of Law No. 8609, dated 08.05.2000, No. 8780, dated 03.05.2001 “The Electoral Code of the Republic of 
Albania” 
3Article 115 of Law No. 8609, dated 08.05.2000, No. 8780, dated 03.05.2001 “The Electoral Code of the Republic of 
Albania”  
4Article 116 of Law No. 8609, dated 08.05.2000, No. 8780, dated 03.05.2001 "The Electoral Code of the Republic of 
Albania”. 
5Chapter II, Section 1 of Law No. 8609, dated 08.05.2000, No. 8780, dated 03.05.2001 “The Electoral Code of the Republic 
of Albania”.  
6OSCE / ODIHR and the Venice Commission of the Council of Europe, Joint Recommendations on the Electoral Law and 
Electoral Administration in Albania, Opinion no. 273/2004 (Warsaw / Strasbourg: November 2, 2004) 
7Report of the Head of the OSCE Presence in Albania OSCE Permanent Council's June 2, 2005.  
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adopted, that is in force. Under the provisions1of this code, heads of political parties were given the right to 
present their candidature in one or more zones. This is a franchise that is contrary to Article 18 of the 
constitution. 
So, my opinion is to restore the previous electoral model, viz. to the mixed proportionalmajoritarian 
system, because in my view, the compromise of major political forces for a consensual electoral code was not 
effective for the Albanian representative democracy because, it removed the voter from the candidate.This was 
reflected in the recent parliamentary elections widely. Beside it, continued to consolidate the old tradition of 
electoral culture where the voter “bigoted” of a particular party showed no “revolt” by voting, institutional 
mechanism in the hand even in those cases where, there were completely principled and 
programmaticinconsistent with the preferred candidate of the party leader.In this context, I think it is doing a 
regression and it is necessary to amend the constitution by changing the electoral system. 
 
3. President of the Republic after April 2008 - representative of the parliamentary majority, but not of 
the unity of the people 
In the fourth part of the Albanian Constitution, many provisions are reserved to the President of the Republic. 
“The President of the Republic is the head of state and represents the unity of the people”2. This provision has 
not changed even though in principle, because it is sanctioned, the all Albanian Constitutions, however, I think 
that has changed fundamentally and conceptually, bringing regression to the consolidation of the constitutional 
position of head of state.If we were to do a retrospective on the image of the President in post-communist 
Albania, we will highlight the fact that the position and his role has changed in three important constitutional 
phases, thereby defining the form of state and government. 
In the period of Provisional Constitution may say that Albania has been a form of government 
characterized by semi-presidential featured although in fact the President is not elected directly by the people, 
but elected by Parliament and in the first voting, required a qualified majority of 2/3 of the members of the 
Assembly. “The President of the Republic of Albania is elected by the National Assembly between at least two 
candidates for five years, by secret ballot and by a majority of two thirds of the votes of all deputies. If in the 
first voting does not obtained the required majority becomes a second vote in which the president is elected by 
an absolute majority of votes of all deputies.”3 
This majority was not essential because, its failure led to a second ballot which only required 50% + 1 
of the members of the Assembly, which means that the President, who had to appoint a significant part of the 
constitutional bodies, of guarantee, substantially elected by the majority who possessed the Assembly.This 
brought a vulnerable constitutional system, as lacked any element of guarantee, because not predicted the 
election of President directly by the people, not predicted majorities qualified for the selection of members of the 
bodies of guaranteeas well as not guaranteed any form of neutrality and impartiality within the system. 
With the adoption of the Constitution of 28/11/1998, constitution-maker, deliberately, taking advantage 
of previous mistakes, was led about a presidential figure approved by a qualified majorities that evoked the 
stimulation of consensus among the parties by maintain the parliamentary form of government in a guaranteed 
constitutional system.In fact, Albanian Constitution provides no qualified majorities for the election of organs of 
warranty. However this regard guaranteed with a consensual presidential figure who nominated the most part of 
these bodies.The election of President, not by a temporary majority, but by a joint vote of the majority and the 
opposition, not only fulfill the purpose of the constitution-makers, but guaranteed the system of constitutional 
bodies appointments by providing them with the elements of impartiality and neutrality in harmony with the 
Constitution.4 
If we refer to the current Constitution, after the constitutional changes, we conclude that the President 
of the Republic, if he can not be chosen with the dialogue, ie from 3/5 of votes in the first three ballots, then in 
two recent ballots, is constitutionally guaranteed the right  to parliamentary majority choose the preferred 
candidate to represent the unity of the people. “The President is elected in the first, second or third voting, when 
a candidate receives not less than three-fifths of the votes of all Assembly members. In the fourth and fifth voting 
elected president is the candidate who receives more than half of the votes of all members of the Assembly.5” 
The question in this situation is: Can represent the unity of the people, a president elected with 71 votes, 
or would it be a genuine representative of the unity of a president elected according to the space provided in the 
first three rounds? I think that for Albanian democracy, more appropriate would be the second option, namely a 
                                                          
1Article 67 of the Electoral Code of the Republic of Albania 
2Article 86/1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Albania 
3Article 25 of Law no. 7491, dated 29.04.1991 “On Main Constitutional Provisions" 
4 Gajda R -The role of the President of the Republic of Albania in ensuring the constitutional order. Constitutional 
modifications, 2008, a glitch in the system warranty, DrejtesiaShqiptare.com, 2014 
5Article 87/3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Albania.  
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president by a qualified majority. Recently, it has been widely discussed for another election formula of the 
president directly by the people. In fact, this discussion is even earlierand, it is proposed in the Law Commission 
meeting, which took into consideration the articles of the Constitution that would be subject to amendment. 
At its meeting on 16 April, the Commission of Laws continued with the consideration of other proposed 
articles. The integrated draft law accompanied by an explanatory report, which provides legal arguments for the 
necessity of the proposed amendments. In addition to comments on the electoral system, the report clarifies also 
the new proposals for the election procedure of the President of the Republic, in order to avoid political and 
institutional crisis unnecessarily, which would lead to early elections.1So, the main reason that political forces 
gave to justify this change consisted in eliminating the potential and hypothetical risk of systemblockingfrom the 
opposition, resulting in early elections.  
In the meeting of 18 April, in relation to Article 5 of the draft law, which amend the article 87 of the 
Constitution “on the procedures for the election of the President of the Republic” a group of more than 1/5 
deputies of the Assembly lodged in the Commission an suggestion  to the amendment of this article,  which had 
in its essence the election of President by the people.After the voting in the Commission, the amendment with 13 
votes against and 5 in favor was not adopted by the Commission. The commission with 13 votes in favor and 5 
against approved the amendment presented in integral text for the draft law according to the proposal of two 
relators. By assessing the final integrated draft, which is approved by the Law Commission in accordance with 
the Constitution, the article 177 by the formal - legal viewpoint, the provisions of the draft law, presented to the 
plenary session for approval, were signed by more than one fifth of all deputies. 
According to my view, all the progress in constitutional changes and especially the procedure of 
election of the President of the Republic is hurried, because the consequences have had a direct impact on 
standards of democracy of independent institutions. Currently the biggest danger is the loss of warranty in 
choosing independent bodies.Despite the fact that the current president and the ruling majority have different 
political affiliations, however, can not claim dominance of the constitutional principle of loyalty, as each of them 
can block the will of tjetrit.Presidenti can hinder the promotion of personalities on top politicized of independent 
institutions, but on the other hand, the parliament has the constitutional space for not approve candidates 
proposed by the head of state. So, practically constitutional changes of 2008 brought no greater guarantee for the 
stability of the constitutional system. 
 
4. The effect of the constitutional changes in the appointments and issue of mandates.  
The Constitution of Albania, as in many democratic constitution, for some major institutions are clearly defined 
the mandates of their leaders. With them are related quite procedural issues, enabling the realization of relevant 
tasks and, in particular, to realize two basic democratic-governing principles: the division of power and their 
control-balancing.Normally, the duties, requirements, terms and competencies for these mandates or other 
representatives of main institutions or independent ones, expressed in the articles of the constitution, in the 
relvant decrees and laws. 
Through them, at least in the formulation, the main goal has been and remains the quality and ability, 
honesty, transparency, reliability and impartiality in the selection, appointment or election.Also, in addition to 
the above features, such processes can be singled out and the following:  
· requirements to be met;  
· process of selection, appointment or election;  
· the mandate (how long can he stay on task, how many times can be selected);  
· legal substitution, release or removal from the duty; 
· powers and responsibilities;  
· privileges and immunities.2 
What should be emphasized is the fact that as a result of these changes resulted that there was a lack of 
coherence because many situations directly related to the mandate remained pending and uncertain. The current 
deadline of the general prosecutor's mandate is five years. The Constitution has been amended, but prosecutors 
were appointed before the constitutional changes, when there was no long term.How to solve this constitutional 
problem, in the situation when the originators of these amendments had not anticipated any transitional provision 
in connection with the termination of the mandate of the the general prosecutor?Here there is a place for 
doctrinal discussion. A part of lawyers, think that the calculation of the 5 year term of the mandate should start 
after constitutional changes, another part, of Americans and German lawyers have the opinion that the general 
prosecutor, which has exercised the function before constitutional changes should have a mandate indefinite. 
If we refer to the Albanian model for the appointment of judges of the Constitutional Court and the 
                                                          
1Report: On the draft law "On some Amendments to the Law no. 8417, dated 21.10.1998, "The Constitution of the Republic 
of Albania", as amended 
2Panorama Newspaper: Opinion -Rexhep Meidani "Reflections on Constitutional changes", December 17, 2011.  
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Supreme Court, where everyone has an equal sphere of competence, there were weaknesses and shortcomings in 
functioning, and is frequently charged that this model has issued judges that do not guarantee independence and 
impartiality in the trial.In this context, we note that this model has functioned without debate, only in the periods 
when the appointment of judges has been the product of previous agreements between the parties, which usually 
indicates that the appointment of a judge is conceived as a political appointment. This is evidenced, and by the 
conflict between the President of the Republic and the Parliament on the appointment of judges, who not only 
did not solve, but also was worsened even more, especially after the 2008 constitutional amendments, which 
clearly was felt a cooling of institutional relations between President and the majority.1 
5. Conclusions  
In Albanian society this year is being widely discussed for amendments and constitutional reform. Is thought that 
the time is right to take such a step, although the possibility is still in consultation stage in different ranks, 
including civil society, academics and members of political life.Asked where they should be extended these 
reforms, I think that I gave the answer during the above treatment. In my opinion, the essence of constitutional 
reform should be to fix the errors of constitutional amendments of 2008.It should be considered as advantage, the 
fact that the decision is waived within closed doors, giving access to the public to express its views in relation to 
issues where reform should focus. Albania needs to reform that extends in many components of the 
constitutional system.A real and serious reviewshould be subject to the Central Election Commission, which 
should be aimed, the transformation of this structure, by it current bipartisan, in an independent institution in 
constitutional law, similar to the initial version of the Constitution. This serves to increase the standard of 
representative democracy.I do not let more space to legitimacy of will, of the chairman of the party, which often 
reaches to the limits of arbitrariness, including candidates in electoral lists “favorite”, who are not necessarily the 
best. Therefore, in the interest of expanding the representation and promotion of individuals with intellectual 
potential and integrity. I think the best alternative for Albania is majoritarian electoral system with proportionate 
elements.Its application will reveal the new political elite, would bring more diverse political distribution and 
reconfiguration of the parliament in the right proportion between vote and mandate sharing.Another issue that 
should be at the center of proposals for reform should be the procedure of election of the President of the 
Republic. In my opinion, the current formula does not guarantee a consensual president and representative of the 
unity of the people, but bring an expression of the will of the majority.I disagree with lawyers who think that the 
election of the President should be realized by the people with direct although this idea is supported by a part of 
civil society and academics. If we were to make such an amendment to the constitution, I think this should be 
regarded as a substantial amendment, because it affects the basic constitution part. If we were to make such an 
amendment to the constitution, I think this should be regarded as a substantial amendment, because it affects the 
basic constitution part. Thus, in the hypothetical case of converting the proposal into law, we can say that 
Albania has approved a new constitution and not amendment to earlier constitution.For this reason, I think that 
the procedure of electing the president should be by qualified majority, just as was predicted before the 
constitutional amendments of 2008. Finally, my proposal regarding the issue of appointment and mandates of 
officials who are in charge of independent bodies is to show special attention to any attempt aimed at limiting the 
mandate in violation of the law. The law has no retroactive effect, to this principle should not be overlooked, as 
it is detrimental to democracy and constitutional justice. 
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